MikeLigalig.com

A Little Background, Just So

A string of remote small islands (actually atolls and reefs uninviting to human habitation) some of which are claimed by the Philippines is also claimed in whole or in part by China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and Brunei.    

An idea of how delicate these individual claims are can be gleaned from the current situation in these islands.  Brunei has a fishing zone that overlaps a southern reef, Vietnam is occupying 25 islands, China’s presence is in nine, the Philippines is in eight, while Malaysia is occupying three.  To expect any of these countries to give up its claim anytime soon is to expect the moon to fall to earth.  National pride will always have its place in the scheme of international relations.  

These claims of ownership by different countries complicate even the names of the islets.  An example is the biggest island called Ligaw by the Philippines.  For Taiwan, the same islet is called Taiping Dao.  It is Dao Ba Binh to Vietnam.  Or consider Mischief Reef, which is Meiji Jiao for China, Da Vanh Khan for Vietnam, and Panganiban to the Philippines.  

For that matter, while the whole archipelago is better known internationally as Spratly Islands, after the English mariner Richard Spratly, the Philippines calls seven of its claimed portion as Kalaayaan Islands.  All these different claims seem to give the islands an identity crisis on top of their being the subject of territorial disputes.

Only 20 of the islets are deemed capable of sustaining human life.  The total land area of the whole archipelago, or group of islands, is less than five square kilometers.  It is composed of a little less than 150 islets scattered over an area of around 400 thousand square kilometers of the South China Sea.  So what is in this apparently economically valueless archipelago that’s muddying international relations of neighbor-countries? 

Location is one.  Where these seemingly insignificant islets are located bears heavily on the definition of international boundaries and sea lanes. 

Another is the rich fishing grounds that the archipelago offers. 

More important, if not more delicate, is that initial studies show that the islands may have potentially significant oil and gas.   

The claims of China and Vietnam are based on the two countries’ old maps, which, in the case of China, showed the archipelago’s inclusion sporadically at best in different eras in its history. 

The claims of Brunei and the Philippines are based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which stipulates that a country’s jurisdiction extends up to 200 nautical miles.  It is to be noted that the Philippines claims only 60 of the islets, which are within it’s EEZ, and not the whole archipelago.

[In 2009], the Philippine Senate passed a bill marking out its maritime boundaries in the country’s claim to part of the islands, taking care to acknowledge rival claims.

It was this legislative move that brought about the column of Hongkong-based Chip Tsao who belittled the Filipinos as “a nation of servants” and implied that our country punches too high beyond its reach for claiming the islands like China. 

Way giliatan ang China karon. Sa akong tan-aw, kining ilang paturagas og pangangkon apil na ni pamawi sa ilang kauwaw kay mora silag gisagpag wag tuo sa kainutil sa ilang claim sa Taiwan...

mora diay nig, 'if not taiwan, then the spratlys, and on to the philippines and the rest of asia'?

Saving face kintahay...

Quote from: hubag bohol on April 21, 2011, 09:46:28 PM
Saving face kintahay...

indeed.

Taiwan Relations Act (United States-Taiwan Relations Act)

1979 - The Taiwan Relations Act is passed by the United States Congress after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. It more clearly defines the American position on Taiwan and its cross-strait relationship with Beijing.

This act also requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character", and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

Successive U.S. administrations have sold arms to the ROC in compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act despite demands from the PRC that the U.S. following legally non-binding Three Joint Communiques and the U.S. government's proclaimed One-China policy (which differs from the PRC's One-China Policy).

The Taiwan Relations Act does not require the U.S. to intervene militarily if the PRC attacks or invades Taiwan, and the U.S. has adopted a policy of "strategic ambiguity" in which the U.S. neither confirms nor denies that it would intervene in such a scenario.

(wikipedia)

The PRC views the Taiwan Relations Act as "an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China."  The Three Joint Communiques were signed in 1972, 1979, and 1982.

1982 - The United States declared that the United States would not formally recognize PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan as part of the Six Assurances offered to Taipei.

late 1990s - the United States Congress passed a non-binding resolution stating that relations between Taiwan and the United States will be honored through the TRA first. This resolution, which puts greater weight on the TRA's value over that of the three communiques, was signed by President Bill Clinton as well.

2007 - Congressional Research Service Report confirmed that US policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan.

(wikipedia)

U.S.- Philippines Security Relations

The post-U.S. bases era has seen U.S.-Philippine relations improved and broadened, with a prominent focus on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the importance of the security dimension.

…a strong security relationship rests on the 1952 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

February 1998 - U.S. and Philippine negotiators concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), paving the way for increased military cooperation under the MDT. The agreement was approved by the Philippine Senate in May 1999 and entered into force on June 1, 1999.

October 2003 - the U.S. designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

January 2011 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell said  that the United States will help boost the capacity of the Philippines to patrol their own waters, including the Spratly islands.

(wikipedia)

China is in a precarious situation. She is the subject of a containment policy.

Quote from: islander on April 22, 2011, 12:45:51 AM

U.S.- Philippines Security Relations

The post-U.S. bases era has seen U.S.-Philippine relations improved and broadened, with a prominent focus on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the importance of the security dimension.

…a strong security relationship rests on the 1952 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

February 1998 - U.S. and Philippine negotiators concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), paving the way for increased military cooperation under the MDT. The agreement was approved by the Philippine Senate in May 1999 and entered into force on June 1, 1999.

October 2003 - the U.S. designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

January 2011 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell said  that the United States will help boost the capacity of the Philippines to patrol their own waters, including the Spratly islands.

(wikipedia)

The Philippines has supported America's operations in Asia. In the Korean War, a Philippine Batallion was sent and was able to neutralize over 10,000 Chinese during its operations there.

The Philippines also sent an engineering Batallion to support American operations in the Vietnam War. During that time, the Philippine Armed Forces had man power of 250,000 strong (not including auxiliary and national reserve).

During this time The Philippines was operating F-6 Phantoms as air superiority fighters. Chinese Migs would have been sitting ducks to these fighters (during that time).

The Chinese feel that they are being contained by a duplicitous United States. In their view, the United States is continuing its defense sales to Taiwan, a nation that the People's Republic of China considers a rogue province. Any and most of Taiwan's defense structure and armament are from the United States Military. In regards to the Philippines, the recent Visiting Armed Forces Agreement between Manila and Washington have bolstered old ties and the annual CARAT exercises between the navies of the United States and the Philippines have added a 3 dimensional structure between the two powers; enabling the two countries to combat terrorism in the region as well as re-vitalizing their 5-decade old mutual defense treaty, which places the Philippine's as America's Major Non-Nato Ally.

China, with a growing military defense policy and a growing military force, believes that the region should be a Chinese Lake. It claims total sovereignty on the entire Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by other nations: namely the Philippines and Vietnam, the two countries being the staunchest in their claim; aside from China, of course.

China cannot and will not engage the Philippine Navy directly. Tho she (China) can probably sink most of the Philippine Surface Fleet, it will be received by the global community, and most importantly the United States, as an act of unwarranted aggression to the Philippines. The United States would send the US Pacific Command to aid the Philippines, which, at this time, the People's Republic of China cannot afford to engage.

China can only claim and bully foreign ships. In the end of the day, she cannot engage the Philippines directly. For now...

Quote from: islander on April 22, 2011, 12:36:46 AM
The Taiwan Relations Act does not require the U.S. to intervene militarily if the PRC attacks or invades Taiwan, and the U.S. has adopted a policy of "strategic ambiguity" in which the U.S. neither confirms nor denies that it would intervene in such a scenario.

Strategic ambiguity? The adjective is superfluous and the noun is a joke...

Quote from: hubag bohol on April 22, 2011, 05:44:40 PM
Strategic ambiguity? The adjective is superfluous and the noun is a joke...

maybe this is used because this seems more palatable than strategic duplicity.

Quote from: islander on April 23, 2011, 01:01:00 AM
maybe this is used because this seems more palatable than strategic duplicity.

Oh well, even your enemies would be strategically uneasy if you to called a spade a spade, especially if it's your own...