MikeLigalig.com

nice.

Quote from: islander on August 14, 2017, 01:23:54 PM

have you tried the chocolate-flavored muron from leyte? am crazy about it. super!

wowzers! havent had this since my last trip. huhu.

wow lami. pwede mo palit, sir?

ha ha ha.

Can you find the State of Chen (Tan) in the map? It is in present day Guangdong , in Southern China.

It touches on some historical information about the origin of the clan name, the State of Chen (陳國), Yingchuan Hall (穎川å ,), the Chen Dynasty (陳朝), the southward exodus from the homeland in Henan Province (河南省) and later settlements in southern Guangdong Province (廣東省). It should be remembered that the majority of the present-day descendants of the Chinese immigrants who went overseas originated from Guangdong Province (廣東省) mainly from the Pearl River Delta Region (珠江三è§'æ´²) not far from Hong Kong (香港), and also from southern Fujian Province (福建省), mainly from the Xiamen (Amoy) (夏門) area.

So let's talk about the origin of the name.

A great source for reference in retracing the Tan / Chan / Chen surname. We are fortunate that the Tan / Chan / Chen surname is one of the largest surnames in China. So there is a lot of research in its collective origin, history, and current digression into Greater China and into Southeast Asia and Beyond.

http://houseofchinn.com/

The world order remain the same:

1. the haves
2. the have nots

Quote from: Ricky Caluen on June 16, 2016, 01:06:25 PM
Hi, Lorenzo (and other Tan relatives). Kumusta na?



I reviewed some of our exchange above where you noted that your greatgrandpa Tan Ngai was a first cousin of my Oyong. This is accurate because my Lola Conching was close to his children (your grandma and grand uncles, etc.). She referred to them as "mga pag-umangkon ni Papa". In the family history written by my Lolo Jorge he mentioned that my Oyong was responsible in bringing a few cousins to the Philippines just before the turn of the 20th century and these cousins settled in Leyte, Bohol, Sulu. Again, to recap, it was a cousin from Sulu who encouraged my Oyong to return to China on the eve of the communist revolution in 1949.

Hehehe, its good to see clarification and some definitive relations. Then this would make you , officially, a distant uncle of mine. Hehe, its good to see that the blood of our Tan ancestors live on and are preserved through their descendants.

I asked my mother about this and searched for clarification about distant relatives of Lolo Mariano's, she would say to me that "kahibalo to si Mama ang anak sa igsoon ni Lolo Mariano". It was evident that while she was alive, My grandmother had an active relationship with her cousins.

I am glad that tho my Lola Nating is gone, i have somehow re-connected with distant relatives that she may have known of .

Blood does seek blood.


Regards.

Hehe, thanks, Tita.

Mr. Ricky Caluen,

Thank you for sharing the information and its so good to see that you were able to have a family reunion. Unfortunately i wont be able to attend this summer 2017, but will be back in the Philippines this October 2017.

Let's connect on facebook.

paging tita isles ! what's up !

You said you're also related to Salise? My maternal grandfather is a Salvo-Salise. In fact my great grandmother is the late Mrs. Dionisia T. Salise, who hailed from Barangay Anas. It seems to me that the Tan immigrants who settled present day Valencia occupied the areas of Sawang. My great grand father , the late Mariano Tan, settled in Sawang, Valencia. My ancestral home in Valencia is the very home that he had built the foundation upon.

PS. Good to see you still keeping this thread up to date.

Mike, ari ta karong October 2017. Hehe.

Hehehe, aww, mao ba?

Lami ni i sagol og condensed milk. I pareson pod og init kape. kulirez!

 Kamusta naman Mr. Daray ! Happy Fiesta to your native town of Corella ! hehe !

Kahinumdum pa ba ka nako?

Congratulations on a job well done ! A di yos ka mo ma ga abu!

Do not wear yourself out to get rich; have the wisdom to show restraint.
-proverbs 23:4

A great read !

Hello my friend,

There are sure health benefits (especially vitamin supplements, which are rich sources of antioxidants!) of using alternative forms of health therapy such as herbal supplements, and nutrition therapy. There is no reason why alternative therapy cannot work in conjunction with traditional forms of medicine, provided that there are no contraindications and/ or risks. Since I am not your PCP and have no access to your complete metabolic panel and do not know your intake and output history, i cannot give an accurate medical diagnosis or prognosis -- only your PCP and internist / gastroenterologist has that right -- provided the patient-clinician rapport system.

In a general concept, i will say that the use of apple flush or these nutrition therapies may have some health benefits, however, one has to be mindful if these diet therapies are contraindicated to one's current medication regimen (this is , of course, specific for person to person).

I hope that helps clarifies the issue and if you have anything else to ask -- feel free to do so here. I'm busy nowadays with work, so i apologize for my inability to respond in earnest here.


Regards,

Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.

-Hebrews 13:2

Amen

Belated happy birthday my brother. Remembering you today, it's been 9 years. 9 years flew, Rob. I hope you're doing okay in the other side.


Love,
with prayers,
Al.

Ah, that's good to know. Thanks kindly for the updated info!

The Lord is kind, full of GRACE and mercy, slow to anger as quick to forgive. Like the father in the story of the prodigal son....

Sometimes we forget that we ,like the prodigal son, are guilty of sins and distance ourselves from our Father God. What we also fail to see , at times, is that Our Father in Heaven is grace filled and will forgive us if only we repent and come to HIM.

Thank you LORD for always being there for us in our happy moments as well in our sad times. And reminding us that you are always there for us, through thick or thin.

Hi ega namoc taga lila,

As to your question regarding your Uric acid levels, I cannot give a comprehensive report or analysis without seeing a complete metabolic panel from you.

That said -- the uric acid levels of the body is related to how much protein (amino acid) you consume. An excess intake of uric acid can lead to uric crystals to deposit in the joints and this is one of the pathophysiology of gout or --- gouty arthritis .

So it might be wise to contact your pcp (primary care physician) to talk to you about therapeutic strategies to alter that uric acid level via pharmacologically and or behaviorally .

As to the question regarding cholesterol and your triglycerides--- there is only one strategy:

Aim to decrease the ldl (low density lipoprotein ) , aim to decrease the triglycerides and aim to raise the hdl (high density lipoprotein ).

Professionally ,I urge you to see your pcp to talk about medical options particularly to treat your hypercholesterolemia , tgl.

I suggest you get labs done ( complete metabolic panel) to see your glucose level and also your h1c level. Because diabetes is a comorbidity that has to be properly maintained.



Regards,

Hmmm, if I may add-- there's just too much media focus in the political dialectic. Perhaps a reboot is necessary? Replace Goldberg with another?

yo, that's cool.

Right now? A night owl, unfortunately.

That would , indeed, be a joyful occasion for Bohol and all Boholanos !

Remember this, bro? Reminds me of that one time when Georgi, Suvarsh, you, Jason, and I sat by Walker Annex Hall at night playing this song on that Autumn day in '04 (our freshman year). All of us sang this playing...with mingled voices (yours truly couldn't hold a tone! ha ha !) it was a good moment in time. Strange how a song played and heard on the radio can prompt us to remember such memories of yesteryear, isn't it? Ah, and such sweet memories, indeed.

The song is "Closing Time" by Semisonic.


This one is for  you, Robbo. Miss you, buddy.

Sing with me...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=nD-Qa6Vvs1w

bwahahaha ka ingon ko,  "Na-unsa man ka"

Has it really been almost 7 months since I last posted here? lol. Time goes by so fast when one is busy, I guess. Unsa pa , hoping everyone is doing great, through Grace of Jesus Christ. Warmest Regards to all!

Love this song...so much. 

Such a sentimental tune....

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FhRfT9iHbKw

"...Every new beginning comes from some other beginning's end.."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xh0ueJN5rvA

You will keep in perfect peace him whose mind is steadfast, because he trusts in you.

-Isaiah 26:3

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsFeOaZsYzo

Bro,

Be-lated Happy Birthday. Miss you much man, sorry for forgetting your anniversary this November, yours truly was a bit busy. Advanced Merry Christmas. Keep me in your prayers as I keep you in mine.


Always,
AL

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ju2Q9qujEo8#ws


Para nimo Nanay Millie, Lolo Ciano. Love you both.

Quote from: hubag bohol on October 01, 2014, 07:00:13 PM
Aw, kon maohon, parison jud diay!

Quote from: fdaray on October 03, 2014, 10:46:35 AM
Dili man problema ang illiteracy, kay puwede makabotar sila bisan gani ang patay.

yallah yallah!

cool dude.

Quote from: hubag bohol on October 02, 2014, 06:27:06 PM



Bwahaha!

hahaha kanay lami igamit sa boxing partner. aber, sparring partner sa kuan ba...ku..an..

bwahahaha! aww, ka ingon ko "one two, buckle my shoe..."

thanks for the share, manay.

Quote from: chicogon on September 27, 2014, 01:32:58 AM
Aw parison diay. Abi pod nakog parion bwahahaha

ang laki parion, ang baji madrion?

joke!

Quote from: islander on September 30, 2014, 11:44:45 AM
i beg your pardon?

how much are these poor animals being paid per hour?

Quote from: hubag bohol on September 28, 2014, 06:49:43 PM

watcha typin ?

Quote from: islander on May 28, 2014, 08:59:05 PM


american sniper with advance invisible rifle
(the invisible rifle can be had with invisible money.  invisible license is free.)

that or maybe he's showcasing some odd fly fishing techniques? ha ha ha

hilig diay ang mga politko sa hari-hari-on kon maohon..

Quote from: hubag bohol on May 28, 2014, 10:24:47 PM
Maldito. Gipan-an og lubot ang kontra...

Curious lang ko unsay ngalan aning posisyon? Attaque du foie gras ?

lmfao

Quote from: Mike Ortega Ligalig on May 29, 2014, 04:02:59 AM


> > > Download TAPATALK free app (Android or iOS) and access TUBAGBOHOL.com in a whole new mobile experience...

Very true. And I would also counsel for those with anger issues, especially repressed and suppressed anger to find a therapist who can provide quality behavioral care.

Cool!

hmmm,

Quote from: fdaray on May 26, 2014, 02:59:21 PM
Sari-sari, karon na sira sira, na kay kusog molotto.

ha ha ha ha ,

sori sori kai na sira sira na diay kon maohon.  

Quote from: Lorenzo on May 28, 2014, 10:44:38 AM
China probably won’t act militarily in this particular situation, but if I’m in charge of the country right now, that pros list is looking more attractive by the day. As wild as this year has already been with the Bo Xilai and Chen Guangcheng incidents, it’s possible that we ain’t seen nothing yet. If any more destabilizing events take place in the lead-up to the power handover, it may become very tempting to finally step over the line from saber-rattling to actual military action in the South China Sea â€" a line many Chinese have been pressuring the government to cross for years.


Reference:
http://sinostand.com/2012/05/11/pros-and-cons-of-war-with-the-philippines/

To the writer from Sinostand:


Its been 2 years since this article was written, and there have yet to be any military action between China and the Philippines. Tho i am unhappy about the current geopolitical chill between Beijing and Manila, I'm thankful that both countries were strong enough to prevent military clashes. And I remain hopeful for diplomatic resolution to this territorial row.

Wo shi Zhongguo he Feilubin xuetong. Yao you zhong guo he Feilubin zhi jian de heping. Yong yuan heping !

ä½ çš,,å...,,弟,

China probably won’t act militarily in this particular situation, but if I’m in charge of the country right now, that pros list is looking more attractive by the day. As wild as this year has already been with the Bo Xilai and Chen Guangcheng incidents, it’s possible that we ain’t seen nothing yet. If any more destabilizing events take place in the lead-up to the power handover, it may become very tempting to finally step over the line from saber-rattling to actual military action in the South China Sea â€" a line many Chinese have been pressuring the government to cross for years.


Reference:
http://sinostand.com/2012/05/11/pros-and-cons-of-war-with-the-philippines/

Pros

    China would control the disputed island and surrounding waters.

    It would send a message to other neighbors that China is serious about enforcing its territorial claims.

    It would end the impression that China will back down from potential conflict with the US. This would be useful internationally â€" especially with regards to Taiwan â€" but even more so domestically, to show the people that the government has the backbone to confront the US.

    It would greatly please the hawks in the military â€" a base which is absolutely essential for the CCP, as they’re the only real guarantors of continued authoritarian rule.

    As with most any war, it would consolidate nationalistic support from the people firmly behind the party, which would be a godsend amidst turbulent domestic issues (ie â€" economic turndown, rough leadership transition).

Cons

    Loss of Chinese soldiers.

    International condemnation â€" would seriously undermine China’s claim of a “Peaceful Rise.”

    This would push China’s other neighbors (Vietnam, Japan, India, Korea) further into the arms of the US and encourage them to increase their defense capability.

    Possibility of a direct US military intervention.

A few weeks ago I felt déjà vu from that day when I was speaking to a class of 20 Chinese grad students in Beijing. We got on the topic of the South China Sea and I expressed concern that a military conflict would break out there someday soon. One girl replied by saying, “I would welcome that.”

Other students chimed in, agreeing that they’d like to see China attack Vietnam or the Philippines. Some wanted to solidify territorial claims; others just wanted to “teach them a lesson” without specifying what exactly that lesson would be. If there were any dissenters in the class, they didn’t speak up.

Over the past few days tension has been rising between China and the Philippines over a disputed island. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed its readiness for battle, and a slew of editorials have said things like “peace will be a miracle if [Filipino] provocation lasts.”

This is nothing new. Brinksmanship over Chinese territorial claims happens pretty regularly. But after speaking with that class and looking at other current events, this time feels especially dangerous. Let’s pretend for a moment that we’re the Chinese government and weigh the pros and cons of going to war with the Philippines â€" ordered from least to most compelling.

I still remember very clearly sitting in a contemporary issues class during my senior year of high school in early 2003. To spark a discussion, the teacher asked who supported the imminent US invasion of Iraq. All 25 of the students raised their hands except two â€" myself, and a German exchange student.

The others listed plenty of reasons for their support: Saddam was a mad man, he was building weapons of mass destruction, he’d killed his own people and he may have had a hand in 9/11. I wouldn’t have been so bothered if I’d felt those were the real motives for nearly the entire class wanting war. But the flimsy and uninformed way many of them made their arguments suggested those reasons were just convenient excuses they were all too happy to latch on to. Quite simply, we had a badass military and it feels good to watch your country flex its muscles â€" especially when you have almost no chance of being personally affected by the collateral damage.

More and more people are embracing the views of US political scientist John Mearsheimer, who has consistently argued that China’s rise will not be peaceful, because Beijing, like any other great power in history, will strive to dominate its own region. In the end, China might manage to win the hard battle against weaker neighbours and a wobbly US. But this would come at the expense of decades of hard-won Chinese soft power, especially among many developing countries that have come to admire China’s economic success and its contribution to a multipolar international order.

In many ways, the recent global recession marked a decisive turn in China’s foreign policy calculus. While China continued to post high growth rates, most leading Western powers, in turn, suffered a dramatic decline in their global standing. Moving to a high-middle-income country level, and flaunting increasingly sophisticated civilian and military technology, China was on the rise in both absolute and relative terms. Meanwhile, three decades of rapid capitalist expansion eroded societal belief in communist ideology, paving the way for a re-embrace of popular nationalism. Many Chinese felt that it was time to reclaim the country’s historical glory, with a special focus on asserting Chinese claims in the Western Pacific.

But as Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney eloquently describes, instead of invading neighbours, China has chosen to engage in “a steady progression of steps to outwit opponents and create new facts on the ground”. In this way, Beijing has still created enough strategic space to avoid outright conflict with its neighbours. Nonetheless, international opinion on China has deteriorated, with the latest Gallup Poll suggesting that China â€" not Iran or North Korea â€" is seen as US’ number one foe.

Aside from external factors, namely China’s integration into international markets and the balance of power in Asia, there were also domestic explanations for China’s largely constructive foreign policy, especially from the 1990s up until the mid-2000s.

During his time in power, Deng Xiaoping â€" China’s former paramount leader, whose ideas have shaped Chinese foreign policy for decades â€" constantly called for pragmatic, low-profile foreign policy, memorably stating “hide your strength, bide your time”. For him, the international system was tantamount to a Darwinian struggle for survival and power, lamenting, “development is the only hard truth… [and] if we do not develop, then we will be bullied.”

The post-Deng China

Witnessing the swift defeat of (Soviet-armed) Iraq in the First Gulf War, China kicked-off a massive military modernisation programme in the 1990s, with increased focus on information warfare, blue-water naval power, and Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

While Beijing tried to justify its growing military muscle as a primarily defensive measure, many neighbouring countries, especially Japan, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, nervously watched the rapid shift in the balance of power in Asia. But no one could tell for sure whether China would abandon its charm offensive in favour of a more assertive foreign policy in the near future.

On the one hand, increased economic interdependence between China and its trading partners in Asia and the West was seen as a fairly effective disincentive against Chinese assertiveness. In addition, it was not until the twilight years of the Bush administration that the world fully realised the growing fiscal and strategic woes of the US â€" the supposed anchor of stability in Asia.

During the Bush administration (2000-2008) â€" when much of the world resented the US’ hyper-power status, which underpinned its unilateral interventions in Eurasia â€" China managed to outshine Washington across much of the Asia-Pacific region, even in places such as Australia.

Nevertheless, many Asian countries still welcomed America’s strategic footprint in the Pacific theatre, hedging against a possible deviation in China’s foreign policy.

The good old days

For years, many Asian scholars have painstakingly sought to explain the complexities of China’s inexorable rise, and how its ascent doesn’t necessarily equate to regional hegemony and territorial aggression. Similar to the Clinton administration, which vigorously espoused the integration of China into the global networks of production, many academics presumed that an isolated, poor China would always be more dangerous than a fully integrated one.

Subjecting China to the forces of economic globalisation, many liberal scholars argued, would “tame” its excessive passions, redress its historical grievances, and re-integrate one of the world’s greatest civilisations into the global economy as a legitimate stakeholder. Arguably, this formula worked â€" at least for some time.

In a span of three decades, China, beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in the late-1970s, transformed from a pariah state into a pivot of economic dynamism and regional stability in East Asia. To the delight of its troubled neighbours, China played an extremely constructive role during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, refusing to opportunistically revalue its currency to attract Western capital. To the bemusement of almost everyone, communist China soon became history’s most phenomenal model of capitalist expansion, catapulting the country to the pinnacle of the global economic hierarchy.

Beijing’s astute utilisation of low-interest loans and cultural diplomacy, coupled with its low-key foreign policy and calibrated official rhetoric, vastly enhanced China’s cachet of soft power, especially among smaller countries in Southeast Asia as well as developing countries in Africa and Latin America. Neighbouring countries, including Japan and the Philippines, welcomed China’s rise as a positive contribution to the expansion and deepening of trade and investment networks in East Asia.

In countries such as the Philippines, popular views towards China have turned dramatically negative, particularly due to the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Worryingly, the antipathy towards China has assumed even an ideological colour, with many Filipinos â€" including some top-level officials I have come across â€" rehashing Cold War paranoia vis-a-vis communist countries. In fellow communist countries such as Vietnam, China is increasingly seen in pejoratively historical terms: as an aggressive imperial power to the north.

After all, recent years have seen a noticeable shift in China’s regional posturing. In the immediate aftermath of the recen financial crisis, which precipitated a dramatic economic downturn across the Western world, many Asian neighbours have woken up to a new China â€" one that is more vocal about its interests, and more capable of asserting them. No wonder many are worried that Asia will once again turn into a tragic site of great power politics.

In sanctions-hit Iran, many merchants have been complaining about China’s allegedly opportunistic business practices, while industrialists and consumers have raised concerns over the macroeconomic and safety implications of cheap imports from China. In Japan, many are worried about their country’s ability to defend itself against a rising China, with the ongoing dispute in the East China Sea sparking a national debate over the proposed revision of Japan’s post-War pacifist constitution.

by Richard Javad Heydarian

“Will China invade its neighbors?” This is a question I tend to be bombarded with whenever I present lectures or attend talks on East Asian affairs. From Tehran to Tokyo, one can sense the growing anxiety towards China’s international influence. People are beginning to pay more attention to China’s military budget than its trade and investment relations with the developing world.

9th Destroyer Flotilla

Submarine-based Cruise Missile; launched from a submarine of the 32nd Submarine Flotilla

People's Liberation Army Navy - South Sea Fleet

PLAAN & PLA conducted a large military exercise focusing on the PLAAN's ability to eject 'foreign' occupying forces of Chinese islands in the South China Sea:

The above posted schematic is the full inventory that makes up the PLAAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) South Sea Fleet.

In a military clash between China and the Philippines, these would be unleashed against the Philippine Navy, Philippine Air Force, and Philippine Marines & Army units.



Reference:
http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/china-military-polls-archive/pla-navy-south-sea-fleet

PLA Navy South Sea Fleet

2.3.3 South Sea Fleet
|â€"â€"9th Destroyer Flotilla:|â€"â€"DDG-168 “Guangzhou”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"DDG-169 “Wuhan”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"DDG-170 “Lanzhou”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"DDG-171 “Haikou”
|                  |
|       1st Frigate Group:|â€"â€"FFG-564 “Yichang”,
|                                      |â€"â€"FFG-565 “Yulin”,
|                                      |â€"â€"FFG-566 “Huaihua”
|                                      |â€"â€"FFG-567 “Xiangfan”
|
|â€"â€"2nd Destroyer Flotilla:|â€"â€"DDG-161 “Changsha”,
|                  |                       |â€"â€"DDG-162 “Nanning”,
|                  |                       |â€"â€"DDG-165 “Zhanjiang”,
|                  |                       |â€"â€"DDG-166 “Zhuhai”,
|                  |                       |â€"â€"DDG-167 “Shenzhen”
|                  |
|        17th Frigate Group:|â€"â€"FFG-552 “Yibin”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"FFG-553 “Shaoguan”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"FFG-555 “Zhaotong”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"FFG-509 “Changde”,
|                  |                      |â€"â€"FFG-510 “Shaoxing”
|                  |
|        18th Frigate Group:|â€"â€"FFG-551 “Maoming”,
|                                         |â€"â€"FFG-554 “Anshun”,
|                                         |â€"â€"FFG-557 “Jishou”,
|                                         |â€"â€"FFG-558 “Beihai”,
|                                         |â€"â€"FFG-559 “Foshan”
|
|â€"â€"2nd Submarine Base
|                  |
|                  |â€"â€"32nd Submarine Flotilla:|â€"â€"SSK-313,
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"SSK-326,
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"SSK-328,
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"SSK-329,
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"SSK-330(Type 039A),
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"SSK-370,
|                  |                                             |â€"â€"Other 2 Kilo-636M submarines
|                  |
|                  |â€"â€"52nd Submarine Flotilla:|â€"â€"SSK-301,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-304,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-305,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-306,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-307,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-308,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-309,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-310,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-311,
|                                                                |â€"â€"SSK-312
|
|â€"â€"6th Landing Ship Flotilla:|â€"â€"2nd Landing Ship Group:|â€"â€"LCT-934 “Dan Xiashan”,
|                  |                                                                   |â€"â€"LCT-935 “Xue Fengshan”,
|                  |                                                                   |â€"â€"LCT-937 “Qing Chengshan”,
|                  |                                                                   |â€"â€"LCT-990 “Wu Dangshan”,
|                  |                                                                   |â€"â€"LCT-991 “Er Meishan”
|                  |
|     16th Landing Ship Group:|â€"â€"LCT-992 “Huan Dingshan”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"LCT-993 “Luo Xiaoshan”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"LCT-994 “Dai Yunshan”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"LCT-995 “Wan Yangshan”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"LCT-996 “Lao Tieshan”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"LCT-997 “Yun Wushan”
|                  |
|    17th Landing Ship Group:|â€"â€"LCT-946 “Songshan”,
|                                             |â€"â€"LCT-947 “Lushan”,
|                                             |â€"â€"LCT-948 “Xueshan”,
|                                             |â€"â€"LCT-949 “Hengshan”,
|                                             |â€"â€"LCT-950 “Taishan”
|
|â€"â€"11th Fasting Craft Flotilla:|â€"â€"2nd Missile Corvette Group:|â€"â€"MCV-751,
|                  |                                                                          |â€"â€"MCV-752,
|                  |                                                                          |â€"â€"MCV-753 “”,
|                  |                                                                          |â€"â€"MCV-754 “”,
|                  |                                                                          |â€"â€"MCV-755 “”,
|                  |                                                                          |â€"â€"MCV-756 “Fuding”
|                  |
|      84th Submarine chaser Group:|â€"â€"PC-694 “Ruian”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-697 “Anji”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-727 “Wuchuan”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-731 “Haishou”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-786 “Wanning”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-787 “Ledong”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-788 “Ding’an”,
|                  |                                  |â€"â€"PC-789 “Lingao”
|                  |
|     4th Landing Ship Group:|â€"â€"LCT-945 “Huashan”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-973 “Wu Zhishan”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-974 “Lian Huashan”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-977 “Ding Junshan”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-979 “”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-980 “”,
|                                            |â€"â€"LCT-986 “A’Lishan”
|
|â€"â€"26th Fasting Craft Flotilla:|â€"â€"10th Minesweeper Group:|â€"â€"MSC-809 “Changning”,
|                  |                                                                      |â€"â€"MSC-835 “”,
|                  |                                                                      |â€"â€"MSC-836 “”,
|                  |                                                                      |â€"â€"MSC-837 “”,
|                  |                                                                      |â€"â€"MSC-838 “”,
|                  |                                                                      |â€"â€"MSC-850 “”
|                  |
|     Patrol Craft Group:|â€"â€"1st Unit
|                  |                  |â€"â€"2nd Unit
|                  |                  |â€"â€"3rd Unit
|                  |                  |â€"â€"4th Unit
|                  |
|    208th Missile Craft Group:|â€"â€"Type 2008 MCA *12 ??
|
|â€"â€"3rd Support Ship Flotilla:|â€"â€"AOR-883 “Yang Chenghu”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"AOR-884 “Jing Bohu”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"AOR-885 “Qing Haihu”,
|                  |                           |â€"â€"AOR-887 “Wei Shanhu”
|                  |
|      Service Ship Group:|â€"â€"Nanyou-961,
|                  |                    |â€"â€"Nanyun-957,
|                  |                    |â€"â€"Nanqin-203
|                  |
|      Instrumentation Ship Group:|â€"â€"Nance-420,
|                  |                                |â€"â€"Nance-429,
|                  |                                |â€"â€"“Li Siguang” Ship,
|                  |                                |â€"â€"Nanbiao-463,
|                  |
|       28分队防æ•'船中队
|                  |
|                  |
|       Reconnaissance ship Group:|â€"â€"Nandiao-412,
|                                                   |â€"â€"Nandiao-411,
|                                                   |â€"â€"233船、
|                                                   |â€"â€"234船、
|                                                   |â€"â€"235艇、
|                                                   |â€"â€"509艇、
|                                                   |â€"â€"852船（原海洋13,更早叫å'阳红21）
|                                                   |â€"â€"æ¹›æ¸"816船
|                                                   |â€"â€"æ¹›æ¸"815船
|                                                   |â€"â€"æ¹›æ¸"822船
|                                                   |â€"â€"æ¹›æ¸"819船
|                                                   |â€"â€"æ¹›æ¸"820船
|
|â€"â€"Shantou Marine Guard District:|â€"â€"5th Missile Corvette Group:|â€"â€"MCV-674 “Pingnan”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"MCV-677 “Tian’e”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"MCV-766 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"MCV-767 “Fu’an”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"MCV-774 “Lianjiang”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"MCV-775 “Xinhui”
|                  |
|     2nd Frigate Group:|â€"â€"FFG-560 “Dongguan”
|                                  |â€"â€"FFG-561 “Shantou”
|                                  |â€"â€"FFG-562 “Jiangmen”,
|                                  |â€"â€"FFG-563 “Zhaoqing”
|
|â€"â€"Beihai Marine Guard District:|â€"â€"81st Submarine chaser Group:|â€"â€"PC-721 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"PC-722 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"PC-723 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"PC-728 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"PC-729 “”,
|                  |                                                                               |â€"â€"PC-732 “Ningyuan”
|                  |
|      76th Submarine chaser Group:|â€"â€"PC-678 “”,
|                                                     |â€"â€"PC-720 “”,
|                                                     |â€"â€"PC-724 “”,
|                                                     |â€"â€"PC-725 “”,
|                                                     |â€"â€"PC-726 “”,
|                                                     |â€"â€"PC-730 “”
|â€"â€"Guangzhou Support Base:|â€"â€"Service Ship Group
|                  |
|     2nd Surveillance Brigade
|                  |
|        Dongguang Silo
|
|â€"â€"Yulin Support Base:|â€"â€"AOR-863 “Chang Xingdao”
|                  |
|     Sanya Rescue Ship Group:|â€"â€"Nanjiu-502,
|                  |                          |â€"â€"Nanjiu-503,
|                  |                          |â€"â€"Nanjiu-510,
|                  |                          |â€"â€"Nantuo-154
|                  |
|      Service Ship Group:|â€"â€"Nanshui-960,
|                  |                   |â€"â€"Nanyun-831,
|                  |                   |â€"â€"Nanyun-832,
|                  |                   |â€"â€"Nanqin-202,
|                  |                   |â€"â€"Nanyou-967,
|                  |                   |â€"â€"Nanyi-09
|                  |
|      Independant 46th Land-based Anti-ship missile Battalion
|                  |
|     7th AA-gun Air Defense Regiment
|
|â€"â€"Xisha Marine Guard District
|
|â€"â€"Zhanjiang Support Base:|â€"â€"Base Communication Station
|                  |
|                  |â€"â€"Ship Technological Maintenance Team
|                  |
|                  |â€"â€"Equipment Technological Maintenance Team
|                  |
|                  |â€"â€"Zhanjiang Arsenal
|
|â€"â€"Nansha Patrol Region
|
|â€"â€"Shajiao Training Base
|
|â€"â€"PLA Navy 8th Aviation Division:|â€"â€"22nd Air Regiment
|                                                      |â€"â€"23rd Air Regiment
|                                                      |â€"â€"24th Air Regiment
|
|â€"â€"PLA Navy 9th Aviation Division:|â€"â€"25th Air Regiment
|                                                      |â€"â€"27th Air Regiment
|
|â€"â€"Independant PLA Navy 7th Air Regiment (Helicopters)
|
|â€"â€"3rd Radar Brigade
|
|â€"â€"Marine Corps 1st Brigade:|â€"â€"Amphibious Armor Regiment
|                                               |â€"â€"Reconaissance Group
|                                               |â€"â€"1st Battalion
|                                               |â€"â€"2nd Battalion
|                                               |â€"â€"3rd Battalion
|                                               |â€"â€"Howitzer Battalion
|                                               |â€"â€"Missile Battalion
|
|â€"â€"Marine Corps 164th Brigade
|
|â€"â€"Combat Ship Group in Hong Kong

Prepared by: Felix K Chang


The ongoing standoff between China and the Philippines in the disputed waters around Scarborough Shoal should serve as a wakeup call for Manila to reassess its external defenses. Since Chinese government ships blocked Philippine authorities from arresting Chinese fishermen accused of illegal activities near the shoal in April, the standoff has fluctuated in its intensity. But it is clear to most observers that if China chose to use force to settle the standoff, the Philippine armed forces could offer scant resistance. Its navy has no ships equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles or any defenses against them; and its air force has no jet combat aircraft left in its inventory.

In contrast, after a two-decade modernization, the Chinese navy has become a formidable power in the South China Sea. While its anti-submarine warfare capabilities may still lag, the navy has greatly improved its capacity to defeat surface combatants. Its ships and submarines are now armed with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and over-the-horizon targeting systems. At the same time, it has markedly enhanced its ability to protect its ships at sea with better shipboard anti-air missile defenses, long-range Su-30MK2 fighters, and by the end of 2012 its first aircraft carrier. Beyond that, China’s Second Artillery Corps can project or, more accurately, hurl power from Chinese shores with an array of conventional ballistic missiles that no Southeast Asian country can effectively counter.

Hence, the Philippines would find it hard to resist China militarily, even in waters close to the Philippine coast. That has led Manila not only to lean heavily on its defense relationship with the United States but to fund serious investments in its armed forces for the first time in decades to create a credible external defense capacity. As part of that effort, it has focused on procurement of surplus American arms and economical combat systems from other countries, in recognition of its still-constrained defense budget.

Even so, the sort of equipment, manning, and skills that the Philippine military can afford to acquire and maintain preclude the development of a force that can directly challenge China’s burgeoning sea powerâ€"which includes not only modern aircraft, ships, and submarines, but also a growing naval base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island from which its navy can quickly surge forces to South China Sea flashpoints. Consequently, like the 2002 Oakland Athletics whose revenue-strapped management adopted an unconventional approach to achieve a winning baseball season, the Philippine government would be wise to seriously consider an asymmetric design for its external defense architecture that takes full advantage of its geographic proximity to the contested waters.

The Philippine island of Luzon is only 240 km from Scarborough Shoal, and Palawan Island lies 450 km from even the most distant Philippine claims in the Spratly group. From Luzon and Palawan, mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could cover most of the disputed waters surrounding these islands. Such missiles include America’s RGM-84L Harpoon, India’s BrahMos, and Russia’s P-800 Yakhont. Denmark, Egypt, South Korea, and a small number of other countries have long used RGM-84 anti-ship cruise missiles as part of their coastal defenses; and Vietnam recently ordered two batteries of P-800 missiles to protect its South China Sea claims. Four batteries of such anti-ship missiles mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles and dispersed along Palawan’s long road network could satisfy the Philippines’ need to deliver the massed firepower that could penetrate Chinese naval defenses. Moreover, their mobility would reduce the possibility that China could suppress them with either air or ballistic missile strikes.

With such an external defense architecture, the Philippine armed forces could deliver the same amount of ordinance against a maritime adversary as a more expensive traditional approach that relies on strike aircraft and ships. That is because in the air only a portion of Philippine strike aircraft could be committed to an attack against a Chinese naval force, given that a number of them would first need to suppress the force’s air cover. Meanwhile, at sea Philippine warships would have to risk becoming potential casualties to Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles before they could even launch their own attack. Finally, whatever losses Philippine forces would suffer in their first strike would reduce their capacity to mount a full second strike. Thus, without an adequate number of combat platforms, it is doubtful whether the Philippine military could overcome the defenses of a Chinese naval force with a traditional approach.

A coastal defense approach could not only cover the Scarborough Shoal area, but also better ensure the safety of the vital Malampaya Natural Gas and Power Project, which supplies nearly half of Luzon’s electricity. Though the most distant Philippine-claimed areas would fall outside the maximum range of current land-based systems, their lower procurement and maintenance costs would allow the Philippine military to program for later procurement of longer-range systems as they become more affordable.

A detailed financial comparison of these two external defense approaches clearly demonstrates that a traditional approach would cost over 50 percent more to procure than one focused on mobile land-based missiles. The former would require modern strike aircraft and stealthy oceanic patrol vessels. Even if the Philippines were to acquire less-expensive kit than its usual American equipment, it would still need a more complex infrastructure in terms of skills and equipment to accommodate them[2]. These costs could total as much as $3.8 billion to procure. In contrast, an asymmetric approach that principally relies on land-based cruise missile batteries, supported by a mixture of land-based MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2 and MIM-120 NASAMS air defense systems, and a smaller complement of air superiority fighters and cutters would cost only about $2.4 billion.

Both external defense approaches that were modeled have the potential to launch 96 AGM/RGM-84L in two strikes against ships at sea. But a coastal defense approach could do so at an acquisition cost one-third lower than a traditional one. That becomes even clearer after considering the losses that a traditional force could sustain to deliver its first strike, whereas a coastal defense force would remain largely intact to deliver a full second strike. Better still, a coastal defense force likely would require a smaller budget to procure, operate, and maintain, since the Philippine armed forces would not have to develop a wholly new infrastructure to accommodate the more technically complex combat systems. Rather, it could build upon the skills that already exist in the Philippine armed forces, such as aviation assets based around the S-70 helicopter platform.

Indeed, the Philippines must also weigh the long-term operational and maintenance costs that it would have to bear to sustain a certain level of operational readiness for its air and naval forces. Since many of China’s past military actions in the South China Sea have been unanticipated, one could argue that the Philippines should maintain a higher state of operational readiness, especially for a smaller defensive force. But a high level of operational readiness carries with it a higher financial burden to ensure that equipment is combat-ready and personnel are adequately trained and available for immediate deployment. To maintain such a high readiness, a traditional force of strike aircraft and ships would likely cost more than a coastal defense force of land-based batteries and helicopters whose operation requires far fewer personnel and equipment that involves tracked carriers or trucks with missile canisters.

While the Philippine government has begun to make more resources available to its armed forces as Chinese assertiveness has increased in the South China Sea, that increased funding may not last, given the country’s many other pressing priorities. So the Philippine military must use its new budgetary authority with care and foresight. Certainly after decades of neglect, the Philippine air force and navy may have service-centric wish lists that have long gone unfilled. But hastily gorging on large purchases may be militarily and fiscally risky in the long run, especially if the new acquisitions prove costly to maintain and preclude the later procurement of other beneficial capabilities.

The Philippine government’s new capabilities-based defense budgeting process offers it an opportunity to create an effective external defense force. Ultimately, such a force is necessary for the Philippines to maintain its maritime claims in the contested waters of the South China Sea. Even if never used, it provides Manila with the leverage to enter into territorial negotiations from a position of greater strength rather than relative weakness. Otherwise, the Philippines will remain reliant on the benevolence of outside powers, like Japan and the United States, whose support is important but whose ability or willingness to intervene may not materialize when needed.

As envisioned, the Philippines could build a capable yet affordable external defense force by eschewing a traditional kit of strike aircraft and ships, and instead pursue an architecture designed around mobile coastal defense batteries equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles and protected by an integrated air defense umbrella. Such an externally strategic defense concept would allow Philippine forces to create a credible deterrent in the South China Sea with lower procurement, maintenance, and operational readiness costs than a traditional force would require. Those lower operating costs would help ensure the sustainability of the Philippines’ newly acquired combat capabilities long into the future.

How can a superpower be bullied? lol.

Quote from: islander on May 27, 2014, 10:15:13 PM
But as Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated, it would be a one-sided confrontation, unless the Philippines can count on the U.S. to answer its calls for military assistance. Herein lies the crux of the Philippines’ security dilemma. Twenty-two years after kicking out the U.S. military, and after decades of failing to create any credible defense capability of its own, can the country count on the U.S. to protect it from China’s aggression?

Geopolitically speaking, the Philippines must purchase new and credible air, land, and naval units to its inventory. The Philippines should not depend totally on the United States' Military, the Philippines must take the initiative now. Years spent on focusing on internal dissension has kept the Armed Forces of the Philippines with a myopic viewpoint. It is time to survey on territorial defense. If the United States can help in building / upgrading Philippine bases, good! However, the nation should actively increase the military's defense spending. The Philippines should raise military defense from 1% of the GDP to at least 2-3% of the GDP.

A good read, one that gives an objective analysis of the current situation regarding the Philippine Armed Forces.

Truly the Filipino spirit. Times may be tough, but the Filipino can hold a smile. Admirable quality.

Bwahahaha ! Aww cute

Millions of pennies lol

There is no place like home and there is no place like home. Home for the millionaires. Ha ha ha

Natural ra man pod. Bata pa siya.

Quote from: Mike Ortega Ligalig on May 23, 2014, 08:58:30 PM
the new illegal drug circulating in the philippines today is called "fly high"

Mike , Mao diay ni ang street name? Kuyaw pod if it was known as "fly low"

Ha ha ha.

Manay Tess: An erection that lasts for more than 4 hours can either be a blessing or a curse. It can be a curse if it is due to a medical disorder called Priapism, where the penis remains engorged with blood, and excruciating pain for the beholder. It can be treated surgically.

A man who can maintain erection for 4 hours without it being secondary to a medical problem -, well then in that case it's due to proper kegel exercise. Kegel exercise can strengthen the suspensory ligaments and muscles that is responsible for penile erection. The stronger these muscles, the longer the penis remains erect and, the longer it will take to to reach climax and orgasm. This can be a blessing and a curse, too. As the partner might achieve orgasm whilst the poor male is still in rising stage. Mo ingon lang si Inday ni Ondoy, " Dali a na Doy, dugaya pod ka da, ka tugun na ko..."

Ha ha ha

Hehe, deep lageh

bwahahahaha!     

by: John Hodgen



He’s supposed to call his doctor, but for now he’s the May King with his own Maypole.
He’s hallelujah. He’s glory hole. The world has more women than he can shake a stick
at. The world is his brickbat, no conscience to prick at, all of us Germans he can ich
lieber dich at. He’s Dick and Jane. He’s Citizen Kane. He’s Bob Dole.
He’s Peter the Great. He’s a czar. He’s a clown car with an extra car.
Funiculi, Funicula. He’s an organ donor. He works pro boner. He’s folderol.
He’s fiddlesticks. He’s the light left on at Motel 6. He’s free-for-alls.
He’s Viagra Falls. He’s bangers and mash. He’s balderdash. He’s a wanker.
He’s got his own anchor. He’s whack-a-doodle. King Canoodle. He’s a pirate, Long John
Silver, walking his own plank. He has science to thank. He’s in like Flynn. He’s Gunga Din,
holding his breath, cock of the walk through the valley of the shadow of death. He’s Icarus,
hickory dickorous, the mouse run up the clock. He’s shock and awe. He’s Arkansas.
He’s the package, the deal, the Good Housekeeping Seal. He’s Johnson and Johnson.
He’s a god now, the talk of the town. He’s got no place to go but down.

Charles Bernstein, 1960




Reality cons me as it spur(n)s me.
This is the road to eternal
Consanguinity, eloping with
Hope and leaving me to pick
Up the proverbial bag.
But that’s the argument for.