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Battle of El Alamein Fight In The Desert 07-11

The fighting was intense and often hand to hand, but no ground was gained by the Axis forces. One of the Australians killed on 31st was Sargeant William Kibby who, for his heroic actions from the 23rd until his death making a lone attack on a machine gun, was awarded the Victoria Cross. On Sunday, 1 Nov Rommel tried to dislodge the Australians once again, but the brutal, desperate fighting resulted in nothing but lost men and equipment. He did however regain contact with the 125th Panzer Grenadiers in the nose of the salient.

By now it had become obvious to Rommel that the battle was lost. His fuel state continued to be critical: on 1 November two more ships laden with fuel and ammunition, the Tripolino and the Ostia had been torpedoed and sunk from the air northwest of Tobruk. The shortage forced him to rely increasingly on fuel flown in from Crete on the orders of Albert Kesselring, commander of German Army Command South (OB Süd), despite the restrictions imposed by heavy bombing of the airfields in Crete and the Desert Air Force's efforts to intercept the transport aircraft.

(4) This phase of the battle began on 2 November at 1 a.m., with the objective of destroying enemy armour, forcing the enemy to fight in the open, reducing the Axis stock of petrol, attacking and occupying enemy supply routes, and causing the disintegration of the enemy army. The intensity and the destruction in Supercharge were greater than anything witnessed so far during this battle. The objective of this operation was Tel el Aqqaqir, the base of the Axis defence roughly 3 miles (4.8 km) northwest of the Kidney feature and situated on the Rahman lateral track.

The initial thrust of Supercharge was to be carried out by 2nd New Zealand Division. The division's commander, Freyberg, had tried to free them of this task, as they were under strength and had lost a brigade. However, in addition to its own 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade and 28th (Maori) Infantry Battalion, the division was to have had placed under its command 151st (Durham) Brigade from 50th Division, 152nd (Seaforth and Camerons) Brigade from 51st Division and the 133rd Royal Sussex Lorried Infantry Brigade. In addition, the division was to have British 9th Armoured Brigade under command.

As in Operation Lightfoot, it was planned that two infantry brigades (the 151st on the right and 152nd on the left) each this time supported by a regiment of tanks—the 8th and 50th Royal Tank Regiments—would advance and clear a path through the mines. Once they reached their objectives, 4,000 yards (3,700 m) distant, 9th Armoured Brigade would pass through supported by a heavy artillery barrage and break open a gap in the Axis defenses on and around the Rahman track, some 2,000 yards (1,800 m) further forward, which the 1st Armoured Division, following behind, would pass through into the open to take on Rommel's armoured reserves.

Supercharge started with a seven hour aerial bombardment focused on Tel el Aqqaqir and Sidi Abd el Rahman, followed by a four and a half hour barrage of 360 guns firing 15,000 shells. The two assault brigades started their attack at 1.05 a.m. on 2 November and gained most of their objectives to schedule and with moderate losses. On the right of the main attack 28th (Maori) battalion captured positions to protect the right flank of the newly formed salient and 133rd Lorried Infantry did the same on the left. New Zealand engineers cleared five lines through the mines allowing the Royal Dragoons armoured car regiment to slip out into the open and spend the day raiding the Axis communications.

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Hi Ray, you know what really surprised me was how Rommel waited too long to strike the 8th Army. In his point of view, I can understand why he waited to properly know the strategic terrain. However, I think that this gave too much time for the 8th army to receive supplies and reinforcement, which in the end, reduced the Afrikacorp's ability to punch through to take Suez.

In my opinion, what Hitler should have done was invest in 3-4 more divisions to support Rommel's Afrika campaign and divert those divisions from the European theater (western theater, that is). I believe that Hitler put too much unecessary resources to his so called 'Atlantic Wall', which in the end, was useless considering the Allies did not invade in Calais as he thought, but in Normandy.

Now, had Hitler sent in about an extra division of Panzers and 3 infantry divisions to support Rommel, the realization of a strategic victory would have been possible. But i cannot help myself from asking: for how long tho?

Considering the fact that at this time, Germany was also invoved in a protracted campaign in the Eastern Front, it was only time before Germany's military industry would be stretched to the limit.

Now, had Hitler signed a peace treaty with Russia, and put pressure in Afrika, then, perhaps, victory might have been possible.

Your view?

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Ray, undoubtedly the main obstacle to the German Military High Command , aside from the Allies, was Hitler himself. His greatest blunder was declaring war on Russia via Operation Barbarosa. This protracted total war with the Soviets drained the German Military Machine's resources, and the theater of operation in the East was the major reason why the Reich was in desperate need of oil supplies, that and the same time, taking the Oil rich North Africa would secure the Reich's southern flank, and at the same time starve the British' colonies in the East of much needed supplies.

For me, I think that the total capitulation of North Africa would have been possible had he done the following (or of the said processes came to effect):

1. Hitler never should have invaded Russia; maintaining a neutral stance with the Soviets, or at least waited till German successfully invaded and conquered Britain. This would have preserved manpower and allowed effective consolidation of newly-conquored regions and much needed raw materials/resources.

2. Rommel should have taken an early offensive in the war; in my opinion, waiting gave the allied 8th Army time to set up a defense that was responsible for the expulsion of Rommels' offensives.

3. The North African theater should have utilized the air force to great advantage; much like Germany's Blitzkrieg strategy against the French in 1940.

4. Rommel should have sent in amphibious assault troops into the Allied positions days prior to his offensive, and enacted decommunication operations. This would have reduced the allied 8th Army's internal communication, and would have preoccupied the 8th army for a time, giving Rommel the much needed advantage. Rommel should then have invaded immediately, whilst the allied 8th army was preoccupied.

Question to you tho:
Where was the Italian Navy in this scenario? The Italians had one of the largest navies in the Mediterranean during this time; it would have helped if Il Duche' sent in 3-5 cruisers, and some destroyers, as well as its carrier to pulverize the Allied defenses. Don't you think?



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Thanks for the link Ray.

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It's good to know that you also like WWII, Ray.


I'd love to talk with you about other things regarding other WWII theaters.

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